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NOTES
THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THE NO-STRIKE AND
INTEREST ARBITRATION PROVISIONS OF THE
EXPERIMENTAL NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT IN
FEDERAL COURTS
INTRODUCTION
The "Experimental Negotiating Agreement"' (ENA) represents
a new and a highly sophisticated approach to collective bargaining
in the steel industry. Prior to the commencement of collective
bargaining negotiations in 1974 and again in 1977, the United
Steelworkers of America (USWA) and ten major steel producers'
entered into the ENA. The ENA was developed by the USWA and
the steel producers as a means to avoid strikes and lockouts. Such
methods of economic warfare had been used by the parties
throughout their history of collective bargaining. In recent negotia-
tions they had become increasingly aware that these methods were
not suited to the steel industry.8
It was the express purpose of the ENA to avoid interruptions
in continuous production in the steel mills.' To accomplish this goal,
1. See MONTHLY LAB. REv. 62 (May, 1973), for a description of the ENA and
its major provisions. The President of the Steelworkers observed that the ENA ac-
complishes the following:
It provides certain guaranteed preliminary benefits for our members in
the Basic Steel Industry; it protects certain existing benefits and rights;
it allows the parties to negotiate freely in almost all economic and fringe
benefit areas; it safeguards certain management rights; it eliminates the
possibility of a nationwide strike or lockout in the steel industry; and it
provides for voluntary arbitration of any unresolved bargaining issues.
Abel, Exploring Alternatives to the Strike-Basic Steel's Experimental Negoitating
Agreement, MONTHLY LAB. REv. 39 (September, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Abel].
2. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., Armco Drainage & Metal Products, Inc.,
Bethlehem Steel Co., Inland Steel Co., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., National Steel
Corp., Republic Steel Corp., U.S. Steel Corp., Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., and
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.. I. ABEL, ENA . . . A BETTER WAY 8 (United
Steelworkers of America, Pamplet No. PR-217, 1973).
3. See note 1 supra.
4. The preamble to the ENA provides:
[iut is highly desirable to provide stability of steel operations, production
and employment for the benefit of the employees, customers, suppliers
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the parties agreed, with certain exceptions,' to submit all unresolv-
ed collective bargaining issues to binding arbitration. Instead of the
strike, the arbitration procedures were to settle all disputes. The
agreement, therefore, is experimental in that it practically
eliminates the strike as a possible method for resolving disputes
over collective bargaining issues. Arbitration of such issues had not
been attempted before on such a large scale in the steel industry.
The existence of ENA presents some difficult questions for
judicial review. If, for example, the Union refuses to arbitrate or
elects to strike in violation of ENA, it is not yet settled whether
federal courts should enforce the terms of the agreement.' Begin-
ning with its decision in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln
and stockholders of the Companies, and the public. To obtain this objec-
tive requires that the Union and the Companies settle issues which arise
in collective bargaining in such a way as to avoid industrywide strikes or
lockouts or government intervention. The parties are confident that they
possess the requisite ability and skills to resolve whatever differences
may exist between them in future negotiations through the process of
free collective bargaining.
Experimental Negotiating Agreement (unpublished) [hereinafter cited as ENA].
Prior to the ENA, the strike or threat of a strike over collective bargaining
issues had created problems that were threatening the vitality of the industry. When
negotiations started, consumers began stockpiling steel and ordering foreign steel in
anticipation of a strike. As a result, around the time that an agreement was made, de-
mand for steel was extremely low. Craft, The ENA, Consent Decrees, and Cooperation
in Steel Labor Relations: A Critical Appraisal 27 LAB. L.J. 633, 634-35 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Craft].
In 1971 the demand was so low that some mills shut down as much as one month
before the collective bargaining agreement expired. Losses to the steel industry as the
result of stockpiling and related problems in 1971 are estimated at 80 million dollars.
1. ABEL, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RELATIONS IN STEEL: THEN AND Now 57-62 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as ABEL]. The arbitration panel may still make determinations in
almost all economic and fringe benefit areas. Abel, supra note 1.
5. Once the procedure has been initiated the parties have only a very limited
control over the possible award. Neither the Union nor the companies wanted to risk
losing certain things. Section D-6 of the ENA excludes from arbitration certain mat-
ters that the parties felt were too important to trust to the uncertainties that inhere
in such a procedure. The matters excluded include: the Union Membership and
Checkoff provisions, the Cost-of-Living Adjustment provisions, the uniformity of wages
and benefits between and among the various units, plants or operations, certain wage
increases and bonuses, the no-strike and no-lockout provisions, and the management
rights provisions of the collective bargaining agreements between the Companies and
the Union. ENA, supra note 4.
6. Compare Boston Printing Pressman's Union v. Potter Press, 141 F. Supp.
553 (D. Mass. 1956) (interest arbitration agreement not enforceable in equity), with
Pressmen's Local 50 v. Newspaper Printing Corp., 399 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Tenn. 1974),
affd, 518 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1975) (interest arbitration agreement enforceable in equity).
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Mills' through its decision in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers of America,' the United States Supreme Court has
been developing a federal labor policy to apply to grievance arbitra-
tion and no-strike provisions under an existing collective bargaining
jagreement. Basically, that policy recognizes that such provisions are
enforceable in federal courts.' However, the type of arbitration called
for under the ENA is different in several respects from
grievance arbitration." As a result, many commentators are of the
opinion that the reasoning of Lincoln Mills and related cases11 should
not be applied to an interest arbitration provision of the type com-
prehended by the ENA.1 '
Although the Lincoln Mills decision dealt with a grievance ar-
bitration agreement, it should not be distinguished from interest ar-
bitration cases on its facts. The arguments that favor limiting Lin-
coln Mills and related decisions to their facts are not compelling.
Before Lincoln Mills, federal courts felt that section 4 of the Norris-
La Guardia Act"8 restrained them from issuing injunctions in most
labor-management contract disputes." Furthermore, federal courts
were not certain that section 301(a) of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act" (LMRA) provided any substantive law which could be used
generally to enforce collective bargaining agreements. In Lincoln
Mills, however, the Court decided that section 301(a) of the LMRA
provided jurisdiction to grant equitable remedies under certain cir-
cumstances. Also in Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court said that sec-
tion 301(a) of the LMRA gave the federal judiciary the power to
develop its own body of law to apply to labor-management
7. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
8. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
9. See, e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974);
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
10. See text pages 60-62 infra for an explanation of the differences between
grievance arbitration and interest arbitration.
11. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), was the first
of several cases in which the United States Supreme Court decided that grievance ar-
bitration agreements should be enforceable in federal courts. See text pages 10-15 in-
fra for a discussion of relevant cases.
12. See text pages 62-65 infra for an explanation of how the ENA proposed to
settle collective bargaining disputes through arbitration.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
14. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 458 (1957), the
Court could "see no justification in policy for restricting § 301(a) [LMRA] to damage
suits" and thus ordered specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate grievance
disputes.
15. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1970).
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disputes." The Lincoln Mills decision was supported convincingly by
reference to the federal labor policy that favors peaceful resolution
of industrial disputes. 7 This policy applies to interest disputes as
well as to grievance disputes.' Unless there is a uniform application
of the law under section 301(a) of the LMRA, the federal labor policy
will not be fully implemented.
This note will examine the differences between interest ar-
bitration and grievance arbitration. The distinction between these
two forms of arbitration is thought by some to be of such
significance that an agreement to arbitrate interests should be
treated differently under section 301(a) of the LMRA than an agree-
ment to arbitrate grievances. It is the contention of this note that
the differences between these two forms of arbitration are not so
overwhelming that they should be treated differently under our
federal labor law. In support of that contention, this note will trace
the development of our federal labor law in Lincoln Mills and subse-
quent cases. The argument will be propounded that the policies that
supported the enforcement of grievance arbitration agreements in
those cases also support the notion that interest arbitration
agreements of the type contained by the ENA should be enforced.
Finally, this note will discuss the various ways in which the parties
might violate the interest arbitration provisions of the ENA and
how federal labor law should be applied to such violations.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INTEREST AND GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION
AND A DESCRIPTION OF THE ENA
There are several kinds of arbitration used for the resolution of
labor-management disputes." Those which are significant for this
discussion are grievance arbitration and interest arbitration. They
are often considered to be quite different;' the purposes are clearly
not the same.2
16. 353 U.S. at 451.
17. 353 U.S. at 453-454.
18. See notes 94-100 infra and accompanying text.
19. One commentator has noted that there are four basic types of arbitration
used to settle labor-management disputes: contract interpretation, legislation, policy,
and interest. The first three can be combined into one type labeled grievance arbitra-
tion. Fleming, Reflections on the Nature of Labor Arbitration, 61 MICH. L. REv. 1245,
1249 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Fleming].20. See, e.g., Note, The Enforceability of Interest Arbitration Agreements
Under Section 301(o) of the Labor Management Relations Act 27 SYRAcusE L. REv.
985 (1976).
21. Fleming, supra note 19, at 1249.
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Grievance arbitration" is concerned with settling disputes over
the application or implementation of existing provisions of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement.' Thus, in the case of grievance arbitra-
tion, the parties have already agreed to specific contractual provi-
sions which are to govern their relationship." Disagreements often
arise as to how these provisions are to be applied, or what they
mean. Many collective bargaining agreements outline a grievance
procedure for the possible resolution of such problems." Occasional-
ly the dispute is not settled in the grievance procedure. Agreements
often provide that in this event the parties must submit the ques-
tion to an impartial third party-an umpire or arbitrator-who, ac-
ting in a quasi-judicial capacity, makes a determination by which the
parties have agreed to be bound."
22. Another term for grievance arbitration is "arbitration of rights." P.
HAYES. LABOR ARBITRATION/A DISSENTING VIEW 15-16 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
HAYES.
23. The collective bargaining agreements that have been negotiated between
the parties to the ENA are called Basic Labor Agreements (BLAs). Coordinating Com-
mittee Steel Companies v. United Steelworkers of America, No. 77-861 (W.D. Pa. July
29, 1977).
24. Actually, in arbitrating grievance disputes, the arbitrator may be called
on to do more than simply apply specific contractual provisions. It is generally
recognized that the parties cannot foresee every possible contingency that may arise
throughout the term of their collective bargaining agreement. Thus, the arbitrator
may be called upon to resolve disputes when no specific contractual provision com-
prehends such a dispute. See HAYES, supra note 22, at 6-7.
25. The 1974 Basic Labor Agreement between United States Steel Corpora-
tion and the United Steelworkers of America provides for a grievance-arbitration
procedure that is typical of those that apply to the other nine companies that are par-
ties to the ENA. It provides in pertinent part:
The provisions of this agreement constitute the sole procedure for the
processing and settlement of any claim by an employee or the Union of a
violation by the Company of this agreement. As the representative of the
employees, the Union may process complaints and grievances through the
complaint and grievance procedure, including arbitration, in accordance
with this agreement or adjustment or settle the same. (Paragraph 0.2)
Coordinating Committee Steel Companies v. United Steelworkers No. 77-861 (W.D. Pa.
July 29, 1977) (quoting the basic labor agreement between United States Steel Corp.
and the Union).
26. See Fleming, supra note 19, at 1245.
27. Section 7:03 of the Basic Labor Agreement between Midwest Steel Divi-
sion, National Steel Corporation and United Steelworkers of America, Local Union
6103 Production and Maintenance Employees-Portage, Indiana (Aug. 1, 1974) pro-
vides: "The decision of the Arbitrator on any issue properly before him in accordance
with the provisions of this Agreement shall be final and binding upon the Company,
the Union and all employees concerned." See also Coordinating Committee Steel Com-
panies v. United Steelworkeis, No. 77-861 at 8-9 (W.D. Pa. July 29, 1977).
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Interest arbitration is different than grievance arbitration in
that the arbitrator in the former is not asked to determine the par-
ties' intention as evidenced by an existing contractual provision.
Rather, sitting as an impartial third party in a quasi-legislative
capacity, he is called upon to formulate terms of a new collective
bargaining agreement for prospective application." Interest arbitra-
tion is normally used when the parties are in the midst of collective
bargaining and are unable to agree on some matter or matters
crucial to reaching an agreement." Although the parties usually do
not decide to use interest arbitration until they reach such an im-
passe, in some cases it has been agreed to in advance and incor-
porated into the collective bargaining agreements.' The ENA,
however, is the first instance where a large, crucial industry has
voluntarily agreed in advance to submit unresolved collective
bargaining issues to arbitration.
Experimental Negotiating Agreement
In 1973, the United Steelworkers of America (the union) and
ten of the major steel producers in this country"1 (the companies),
entered into the Experimental Negotiating Agreement (ENA)." This
agreement was used to control the 1974 negotiations over collective
bargaining issues in the steel industry." It was subsequently
adopted to regulate the 1977 collective bargaining negotiations."
The ENA provides for the resolution of all industry-wide
issues8 through the normal collective bargaining process. However,
28. Note, Quasi-Legislative Arbitration Agreements, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 109
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Arbitration Agreements].
29. See generally MORRISON AND MARJORIE HANDSAKER. THE SUBMISSION
AGREEMENT IN CONTRACT ARBITRATION (1952) [hereinafter cited as HANDSAKER].
30. The ENA is precisely such a "made in advance" interest arbitration agree-
ment. Some cases wherein this type agreement was in issue are: Pressmen's Local 50
v. Newspaper Printing Corp., 399 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Tenn. 1974), affd, 518 F.2d 351
(6th Cir. 1975). A. Seltzer & Co. v. Livingston, 253 F. Supp. 509 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 361
F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1966). Boston Printing Pressmen's Union v. Potter Press, 141 F.
Supp. 553 (D. Mass. 1956).
31. See note 2 supra.
32. See note 1 supra.
33. In 1973 the steel companies and the union agreed to resolve their collec-
tive bargaining demands for the 1974 negotiations through the procedures established
by the ENA. ABEL., supra note 4, at 59-60.
34. The parties were satisfied with the operation of the ENA during the 1974
collective bargaining negotiations. Accordingly, they agreed to extend it to the 1977
negotiations. Id. at 60.
35. Industry-wide issues are those that are negotiated between the companies
and the union at the international level and that apply generally to all the plants of all
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in the event that the parties are unable to reach accord over such
questions, they have agreed to submit them, with certain excep-
tions,' to an impartial arbitration panel.17 The ENA also prohibits
the customary" use of strikes or lockouts to facilitate resolution of
any issues of the type that the parties have agreed to submit to ar-
the companies. See Coordinating Committee Steel Companies v. United Steelworkers,
No. 77-861 (W.D. Pa. July 29, 1977). A better way to define industry-wide issues is to
say that they are everything that local issues are not. Section D-5-a of the ENA
defines Local Collective Bargaining Issues as:
A local collective bargaining issue is an issue entered at plant level, pro-
posing establishment of or change in a condition of employment at that
particular plant which:
(1) would not, if adopted, be inconsistent with any provision of a
company agreement (as defined below) or involve any addition to or
modification of any such provision or agreement:
(2) would not be an arbitrable grievance as defined in the applicable
basic labor agreement; and
(3) does not relate to a grievance settlement or an arbitration
award: provided, however, this subparagraph (3) does not apply to nonar-
bitrable grievances.
The term "company agreement" means any basic labor agree-
ment and all related appendices, understandings, or agreements ... which
contain the kinds of provisions, although not identical in language, includ-
ed in such agreements between the International Union and the United
States Steel Corporation. Any provision of a company agreement that is
solely applicable to a particular plant and is not the kind of provision con-
tained in such agreements between the International Union and the
United States Steel Corporation shall not be considered part of a com-
pany agreement for the purpose of this definition.
ENA, supra note 4.
36. See note 5 supra.
37. Section E of the ENA provides for the appointment of the impartial ar-
bitration panel as follows:
1. Appointment
The Impartial Arbitration Panel shall consist of five members, one
appointed by the Union, one appointed by the Companies and three im-
partial members appointed by agreement of the parties. Two of the three
impartial members shall be persons who are thoroughly familiar with col-
lective bargaining agreements in the steel industry. The Union and the
Companies will agree upon the three impartial members of the Panel and
designate a Chairman on or before February 1, 1977 and will inform each
other as to the identity of their respective members prior to the com-
mencement of any arbitration hearing.
ENA, supra note 4.
38. "Since the end of World War II there have been 10 negotiations in which
the Steelworkers had the right to strike. There have been five major strikes: 1946 (26
days), 1948 (45 days), 1952 (59 days), 1956 (36 days), and 1959 (116 days)." E. LIVERNASH,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE BASIC STEEL INDUSTRY (1976) [hereinafter cited as LIVER-
NASH].
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bitration 9 As consideration for these promises to arbitrate and to
refrain from striking over industry-wide disputes, the union gained
the right to strike at individual plants in support of local collective
bargaining issues.'0 A description of these local issues was carefully
detailed in the ENA."
Compelling reasons prompted the union and companies to
agree to submit collective bargaining issues to binding arbitration.
The parties especially wanted to avoid economic warfare.'" The
strike or the threat of a strike that co-existed with collective
bargaining in the steel industry prior to the ENA had caused some
serious problems to develop which had adversely affected both par-
ties. In anticipation of a possible strike, customers accumulated
large stockpiles of steel prior to the negotiating deadline.'8 Addi-
tionally, the threat of a strike encouraged foreign steel producers to
enter the domestic steel market." Since they could provide steel
throughout the term of a domestic strike, they were in an excellent
bargaining position. Steel makers from other nations could promise
delivery while the domestic producers could not. Thus, many foreign
competitors gained access to the domestic market which would
otherwise have been unavailable to them.'5
In addition to the actual economic repercussions caused by
strikes, the parties were faced with the omnipresent threat of
39. See notes 5 and 35 supra.
40. Prior to the ENA the Union was not permitted to strike at local plants in
support of local bargaining issues. Thus the ability to do so under the ENA was the
"quid pro quo for [the Union's] acceptance of interest arbitration" as provided under
the ENA. Coordinating Committee Steel Companies v. United Steelworkers, No.
77-861 at 4 (W.D. Pa. July 29, 1977).
41. See note 35 supra.
42. The strike or the threat of a strike had played havoc with the Companies
and the Union members throughout the history of unionization in the steel industry.
Out of ten collective bargaining negotiation sessions where a strike was possible, one
had actually occurred on five occasions. The result was a direct loss of 282 days of pro-
duction in a thirteen year period. LIVERNASH, supra note 38. There were economic
repercussions of the strike or threat thereof in addition to the lost production that
came as a direct result of the strike. Consumers stockpiled large quantities of steel
and placed orders with foreign producers in anticipation of a curtailment of domestic
steel supplies. As a result, when negotiations ended, the demand for steel was often
extremely low. ABEL, supra note 4. Thus, it is not suprising tht the parties looked to
arbitration as a preferable alternative to the strike for settling their collective bargain-
ing differences.
43. ABLE. supra note 4.
44. Id. See also Craft, supra note 4, at 635.
45. I&
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governmental intervention." The public had become increasingly in-
tolerant of strikes in major industries which could have an adverse
effect on the nation's economy." Moreover, the government had
manifested an inclination to get involved when the companies and
the union were unable to resolve their differences peaceably.'8 The
ENA helped to ease governmental concern over contract negotia-
tions in the steel industry and thereby enhanced the opportunity for
continued independent resolution of interest disputes.
Thus, the strike and the lockout which were coextensive with
collective bargaining in the steel industry had created a critical
situation. The actual or threatened loss of production was causing
severe economic repercussions. As a result, both the employees and
the employers were suffering. To resolve the problem, the parties
agreed not to strike or lockout over collective bargaining disputes.
They agreed instead to submit such issues to binding arbitration.
Despite the intention of the companies and the union to arbitrate
their disputes under the ENA, the possibility remains that the
agreement will be violated. To determine whether or not an
equitable remedy will be available to the damaged party in a federal
court, it is necessary to examine how the federal labor policy has
been applied by such courts to arbitration and no-strike provisions
in collective bargaining agreements.
APPLICATION OF FEDERAL LABOR POLICY
TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
The federal courts have been developing a federal labor policy
during the past twenty years in response to the maturing labor-
management relationship."' Of significance for the purpose of this
46. The federal government has, for a number of years, taken an active in-
terest in the collective bargaining process in the steel industry. This interest ranges in
extremes from President Truman's seizure of the mills to present day "jawboning" by
the executive. Id. Given this high level of government interest, it is not surprising that
the parties feared that the continued possibility of strikes in the industry might some-
day lead to their loss of the right to bargain collectively. Id.
47. It cannot be disputed that a strike in a major industry is bad for the
economy and causes the public to suffer. Thus one commentator has noted that "the
public concern is fast reaching a flood-tide that will require governmental action in the
form of legislation in the near future." J. HODGSON. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: SURVIVAL
IN THE 70's? 48 (1972).
48. See note 46 supra.
49. "As labor organizations grew in strength and developed toward maturity,
congressional emphasis shifted from protection of the nascent labor movement to the
encouragement of collective bargaining and to administrative techniques for the
peaceful resolution of industrial disputes." Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
770, 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1970).
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note are two separate categories of cases. One is concerned with the
enforceability of no-strike and grievance arbitration clauses that are
comprehended by collective bargaining agreements." The other is
concerned with the enforceability of contracts to arbitrate interest
disputes."1 The former is the more settled area of the law, because
Supreme Court decisions have dealt with it.52 In contrast, the law
regarding enforceability of interest arbitration procedures is still
somewhat unsettled, since that issue has not yet been decided by
the Supreme Court."
The Court's decisions with regard to the enforceability of no-
strike and grievance arbitration provisions in a collective bargaining
agreement are not directly applicable to the issue of whether or not
a violation of ENA should be enjoined. They are, nevertheless, close-
ly related, and arguably the reasoning of those cases should apply in
answering this question. The following review of significant cases
that have dealt with varying degrees of this problem will lay the
foundation for the argument that a federal court faced with a viola-
tion of ENA should order the parties to arbitrate their dispute. At
the same time the court should temporarily enjoin the strike pen-
ding arbitration of the dispute.
The Conflict Between The Norris-La Guardia And The Labor
Management Relations Acts
Before the Court could enforce agreements to arbitrate
grievance disputes or no-strike provisions in collective bargaining
agreements, it first had to deal with an apparent conflict between
section 4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act" and section 301(a) of the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).' Section 4 of the Norris-
50. See, e.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235
(1970).
51. See, e.g., Pressmen's Local 50 v. Newspaper Printing Corp., 399 F. Supp.
593 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd, 518 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1975).
52. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976), Gateway
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974), Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
53. Some federal courts have held interest arbitration agreements to be en-
forceable. Others have held that they are not. For a review of the cases holding both
ways, see Note, The Enforceability of Interest Arbitration Agreements Under Section
301(o) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 985, 986 n.11, 987
n.12 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Enforceability of Interest Arbitration].
54. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970). For a comparison of the history of the two conflic-
ting provisions and an analysis of their purpose, see Note, Striking a Balance Between
the Norris-La Guardia and the Labor Management Acts: Is It Still Feasible After Buf-
falo Forge?, 29 U. OF FLA. L. REV. 525, 526-529 (1977).
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La Guardia Act generally prohibits federal courts from issuing in-
junctions in labor disputes." Section 301(a) of the LMRA, however,
grants federal courts jurisdiction over suits wherein one of the par-
ties to a collective bargaining agreement in an industry affecting
commerce alleges a violation of said agreement.
7
The Court first attempted to resolve this inconsistency in Tex-
tile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama. In Lin-
coln Mills, the company and the union had agreed in their collective
bargaining agreement to submit grievance disputes to arbitration
when they were unable to resolve them in the grievance procedure."
The company refused to submit a grievance to arbitration and the
union, therefore, sought an injunction to compel arbitration of the
dispute.
In its effort to resolve the statutory conflict between Norris-La
Guardia and the LMRA, the Court looked to the congressional in-
tent behind the enactment of the LMRA. This led the Court to hold
that the legislative intent in including section 301(a) was to help
stabilize industrial relations.0 Furthermore, the Court found that
"[tihe failure to arbitrate was not a part and parcel of the abuses
against which (section 4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act) was aimed."'"
56. This section of the Act provides:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restrain-
ing order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or
growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons par-
ticipating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined)
from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts....
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970) (The acts are then defined as strikes and related activities.).
57. Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the par-
ties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to
the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).
58. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
59. Id. at 449.
60. The Court quoted from the Senate report, S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 17-18 (1947): "Statutory recognition of th collective agreement as a valid, bind-
ing, and enforceable contract is a logical and necessary step. It will promote a higher
degree of responsibility upon the parties to such agreements, and will thereby promote
industrial peace." Id. at 453 n.4.
61. Id at 458. Prior to Norris-La Guardia, employers were able to obtain in-
junctions against strikes and other concerted union activity with ease. Often the in-
junction had the effect of undercutting the union's strength. Thus the courts were us-
ed as a tool of management to destroy the union movement. See F. FRANKFURTER & N.
et al.: The Enforceability of the No-Strike and Interest Arbitration Prov
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Thus, the Court concluded that section 301(a) was more than just a
grant of jurisdiction to determine damages in a suit for violation of
a collective bargaining agreement."2 The Court said that it was also
a source of substantive law which was to be fashioned from the
policy of our national labor laws." That policy, the Court concluded,
provided a grant of authority to enforce agreements to arbitrate
grievances.
In spite of the fact that a literal reading of Norris-La Guardia
would have prevented the Court from ordering specific performance
of collective bargaining agreements, its review of the legislative
history convinced the Court that it should not so limit its jurisdic-
tion. Of special significance in the Lincoln Mills decision is the fact
that the Court issued a mandate to other federal courts exercising
their jurisdiction under the LMRA to use their own inventiveness to
develop a federal common labor law to apply to collective bargaining
agreements."
In the famous Steelworkers Trilogy," the Court expanded its
holding in Lincoln Mills. Even after Lincoln Mills, federal courts
GREENE. THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930). Therefore, the purpose of the Norris-La Guar-
dia Act was to create an atmosphere wherein the unions could grow in strength and
stature without the interference of judicial restraint. Section 2 of the Act declares the
public policy of the United States to be as follows:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions .... the individual organiz-
ed worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and
to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms
and conditions of employment, wherefore . . . it is necessary that he have
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of represen-
tatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his
employment, and that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or
coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such
representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection....
29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970). The conditions that encouraged the Norris-La Guardia Act no
longer exist. The labor movement now has considerable strength, and it is extremely
doubtful that it continues to require protection. By 1970 unions enjoyed membership in
excess of 20 million workers. See R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD, & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR
RELATIONS LAW 29-53 (5th ed. 1974).
62. See note 14 supra.
63. 353 U.S. at 456.
64. "The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of
the problem." Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957). Thus
although the LMRA may not contain substantive law that comprehends a situation,
the courts should look to the policy behind that legislation and fashion "a remedy that
will effectuate that policy." Id.
65. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960): United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960): United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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often reviewed grievance cases prior to ordering arbitration. If the
court found that the dispute was frivolous or outside the scope of
the agreement, it would refuse to require specific performance." In
the Trilogy, the Court deferred to the highly developed skill of ar-
bitrators in the area of interpreting and applying the provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement. 7 The Court said that federal courts
are not to decide the merits of a grievance prior to ordering the par-
ties to arbitrate. 8 In addition, the Court found no significance in the
fact that an agreement fails to specifically comprehend arbitration
of the particular dispute." Rather, unless the dispute is of a type
that is specifically excluded from the arbitration clause, the court
should order arbitration. The Court also observed that section
301(a) required that doubts about whether a particular disagreement
is comprehended by the arbitration clause be resolved in favor of ar-
bitrability.7" Obviously, the Court felt that its Trilogy decisions were
necessary to further implement the legislative policy that favors
labor-management tranquility.72 In declaring all disputes to be ar-
bitrable except those that have been specifically excluded, the
66. A. SLOANE & F. WITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS 221 (2d ed. 1972).
67. In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960), the Court observed that the courts may not be sufficiently familiar with the
considerations applied by a labor arbitrator in fashioning a judgment. Id. at 581. The
collective bargaining agreement, said the Court, "is more than a contract . . ." Id. at
578. Thus the arbitrator must do more than apply contract law, he must apply "the
common law of a particular industry or ... plant" when resolving a dispute. Id. at 579.
For a rejection of the Trilogy reasoning see generally HAYES, supra note 22.
68. The arbitration provisions of the agreement should be construed as com-
prehending all matters of disagreement between the parties except those issues which
the parties specifically exclude. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
69. There are too many unforeseeable circumstances. The draftsmen of a col-
lective bargaining agreement cannot possibily anticipate nor include all possible issues
that might arise and be subject to the grievance procedure and arbitration. It is
enough that they do not exclude the particular issue. Id
70. The Court noted that when a collective bargaining agreement contains an
all inclusive no-strike clause as well as a promise to arbitrate disputes, the no-strike
clause implies that every dispute the Union may not strike over is subject to arbitra-
tion. Id. at 577-578.
71. Id. at 583.
72. "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over
the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement .. "
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970). The Court
observed that the policy expressed by this statute could "be effectuated only if the
means chosen by the parties for settlement of their differences under a collective
bargaining agreement is given full play." United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960).
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Trilogy decisions expanded the Lincoln Mills concept that the par-
ties to a collective bargaining agreement should get what they
bargained for.
Despite its reading of the LMRA, which the Court viewed as a
grant of authority to order specific performance of agreements to
arbitrate grievance disputes, the Court remained unwilling to enjoin
strikes in violation of no-strike agreements." Consequently, in its ef-
fort to maintain peace in the industrial setting, the Court had
created a somewhat anomalous situation. Many collective bargaining
agreements had a provision requiring arbitration of grievance
disputes as well as a no-strike provision." The unions were left in
the enviable position of being free to violate the no-strike clause of
an agreement because of the judicial application of the Norris-La
Guardia Act. However, they retained the power to force arbitration
of any, including meritless, grievances. 5
When unions struck in violation of no-strike provisions,
remedies available to companies were not sufficient. An employer
could sue a union for damages for violating a no-strike agreement.
Even if the employer won, however, an award of damages was often
an inadequate remedy. Customers might be lost due to the
employer's inability to fill orders and meet deadlines. The value of
these customers would be difficult, if not impossible, to measure.7
Such a strike would also have a severe, adverse effect on the contin-
73. See Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962). In Atkinso, the
collective bargaining agreement contained a broad no-strike provision and an arbitra-
tion provision. Over a period comprehended by the agreement the Union engaged in
several strikes in violation of the no-strike and arbitration provisions. Nevertheless,
the Court "return[ed] to a pristine reading on Norris-La Guardia" and found that the
law prevented federal courts from enjoining strikes that were in violation of no-strike
agreements. See Stewart, No-STRIKE CLAUSES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 59 MICH. L.
REV. 673, 685 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Stewart].
74. No-strike provisions appear in most collective bargaining agreements. Fur-
thermore, they often co-exist with an agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes. The
combination of these two provisions is intended to "preclude concerted action until in-
ternal remedies are exhausted." R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD, AND D. ROTHSCHILD, COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR ARBITRATION 331 (1970).
75. Politics play a major role in the manner in which a union handles a par-
ticular grievance dispute. Even when a grievance is clearly without merit it may tend
towards the destruction of an official's union career to tell certain employees that they
have no claim. Accordingly, the Union will often pursue such a claim to arbitration.
See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 73, at 687.
76. "A strike in breach of a contract irreperably harms the employer. Orders
are lost. Customers transfer their favor to employers who meet deadlines." Id. at 674.
Thus, "[elquitable relief is not only the most appropriate remedy, but also the only ef-
fective one." Id. at 675.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 [1977], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol12/iss1/3
1977] EXPERIMENTAL NEGOTIATING A GREEMENT 71
uing employer-employee relationship. The agreement to arbitrate
was the quid pro quo for the no-strike agreement,"' yet the company
was not getting what it had bargained for. As a result, employers
were suffering severe economic repercussions."8 Although the Court
could defend its position through a literal reading of Norris-La Guar-
dia,"9 its reasoning was subject to severe criticism.' Finally, in 1970,
the Court declared no-strike provisions to be enforceable under the
authority of section 301(a) of the LMRA.
Enforceability Of No-Strike Agreements
Apparently, the Court found merit in the criticism leveled at
its dual application of section 301(a) of the LMRA. In 1970, in Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770,81 the Supreme Court
reversed its previous refusal to enjoin strikes that were in violation
of no-strike agreements. Admittedly, the Court characterized
its holding in Boys Markets as a narrow one.2 The decision stated
that the only situation where an injunction could be properly issued
was in those cases where the strike was over an arbitrable
grievance and the parties had agreed to submit such a grievance to
arbitration." Therefore, at the same time the injunction is issued,
the court must order the parties to arbitrate the grievance dispute.
Still, unless the union simply strikes as an act of sympathy for
another striking union" and, therefore, not over an arbitrable
77. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960).
78. Stewart, supra note 73, at 674.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
80. It was the consensus of many good lawyers, joined by Justices Black and
Douglas, that the purpose of section 301 of the L.M.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), was to
make "every collective bargaining agreement in commerce enforceable at the instance
of either party." Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreemen4 57 MICH. L. REv. 635,
637 (1958-59) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Gregory]. See also Stewart, supra
note 73, at 689.
81. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
82. Id at 253.
83. In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), the Court had
refused to enjoin such a strike. In overruling the Sinclair decision, the Court stated:
"Sinclair [stood] as a significant departure from [its] otherwise consistent emphasis
upon the congressional policy to promote the peaceful settlement of labor disputes
through arbitration and [its] efforts to accomdate and harmonize [that] policy with
those underlying the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act." Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241 (1970).
84. In Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976), the
Court ruled that an injunction should not issue against a sympathy strike. Therefore,
even though the collective bargaining agreement contained a broad no-strike agree-
ment of which the strike was arguably in violation and an arbitration clause which
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grievance, there is good reason to believe that the Court's
characterization of its holding as narrow should not be construed as
severly limiting the scope of the decision. That description was pro-
bably only meant in a historical sense," since even under the Boys
Markets decision, federal courts still are left with considerably less
power to enjoin strikes than they had before the Norris-La Guardia
Act.
In Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers," decided four
years after Boys Markets, the Court made clear that it did not
regard the Boys Markets decision as severely limiting the power of
federal courts to enjoin strikes. The Court in Gateway determined
that where a collective bargaining agreement contains both a no-
strike clause and an arbitration clause, "the agreement to arbitrate
and the duty not to strike should be construed as having coter-
minous application."87 Thus, where the no-strike clause prohibits all
strikes for any reason, unless certain categories of dispute are
specifically excluded from the grievance and arbitration procedure
as set forth in the agreement, the dispute should be presumed to be
arbitrable.
Prior to Lincoln Mills, federal courts were faced with the
Norris-La Guardia Act which generally prohibited them from gran-
ting equitable relief in labor-management contract disputes. The
Supreme Court found, however, that the LMRA overcomes that pro-
arguably comprehended resolution of the issue of whether the strike violated the no-
strike agreement, the Court refused to enjoin the strike. In so deciding, the reasoning
of the Court is not persuasive.
The Court observed that the purpose of the strike is not to evade the agreed to
arbitration procedure. Id. at 408. Nevertheless, it is clear that the dispute could be set-
tled through arbitration. If the legislative interest is in the peaceful resolution of
disputes in a manner agreed to by the parties, Labor Management Relations Act of
1947, § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970), that interest can be served only by enforcing
the no-strike clause of a collective bargaining agreement as well as the arbitration
clause. "[Tihe same public interest in an enforceable quid pro quo is present here as in
Boys Markets." Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 419 (1976)
(dissenting opinion). Furthermore, the Norris-La Guardia Act was not meant to pre-
vent courts from enjoining sympathy strikes. Id. at 414 (dissenting opinion). Thus it is
not clear why the Court elected to return to a pristine reading of Norris-La Guardia in
this case. Nevertheless, the Court's inconsistent ruling in Buffalo Forge Should not af-
fect a decision to enjoin a strike in violation of the ENA and to order arbitration of the
underlying interest dispute.
85. Accord, Dawson, The Scope of the Boys Markets Rule, 28 OKLA. L. REV.
794, 806 (1975).
86. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
87. Id. at 382.
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hibition in certain instances and contains substantive law that re-
quires the parties to a collective bargaining agreement to live up to
the terms of the agreement. Today, if the parties agree to settle
disputes over an existing contract through arbitration, they will not
be allowed to reject that agreement. A strike over an arbitrable
grievance will be enjoined, and the court will order the parties to ar-
bitrate.
Until now, however, the Supreme Court has only held that
agreements to arbitrate grievances are enforceable. Requiring the
union or the company to arbitrate grievances only partially resolves
the overall problem. One question that remains is whether the par-
ties should be able to gain court enforcement of an interest arbitra-
tion clause of the type that is comprehended by the ENA. Violations
of the ENA are imminent; policy considerations suggest that the
agreement should be enforced when violations do occur.
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF THE ENA AND
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS THAT FAVOR ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT
Despite the reasons which compelled the parties to agree to
the binding arbitration and no-strike provisions of the ENA, there
remains the possibility that during the course of negotiations one of
the parties will decide that it would prefer to resort to traditional
economic warfare to force the other party to concede to its demands."
This decision might manifest itself in more than one way. One of the
parties might simply refuse to submit an unsettled issue to arbitra-
tion. Alternatively, a party might agree to arbitrate an issue with
the hope that the award will be favorable. If the award is not to its
satisfaction, the disappointed party might condemn the award, at-
tempt to thwart implementation of the award, or simply refuse to
accept it." In the latter case, the dissatisfied party would probably
either attempt to reopen negotiations or strike after rejecting the
arbitrator's decision." A final way one of the parties might violate
the agreement would be to reach accord on all industry-wide issues
and then strike at local plants in an attempt to win concessions over
88. In 1977 after reaching accord over industry-wide collective bargaining
issues, the Union ignored the provisions of the ENA and elected to strike at local
plants over non-local issues. Coordinating Committee Steel Companies v. United
Steelworkers No. 77-861 (W.D. Pa. July 29, 1977). For an explanation of local and non-,
local issues, see note 35 supra.
89. HANDSAKER, supra note 29, at 69.
90. A rejection of an arbitration award and a subsequent strike might bring a
court injunction. However, it might also force the company to concede to the union
demands. Id
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non-local issues. 1 Any of these activities would be a violation of the
ENA.
However the violation might occur, it raises a question as to
whether equitable remedies would be available to the damaged par-
ty. Some courts have refused to grant such a remedy." In support of
this refusal, these courts point out that policy considerations lead
them to conclude that the legislature should first speak to the issue
if it intends interest arbitration agreements to be enforced.
Evaluation Of Policy Considerations
Some policy considerations that are said to support the non-
enforcement of interest arbitration agreements are: the possibility
of a burdensome award; the fact that the right to strike is viewed as
necessary for the continued ability of unions to function in the col-
lective bargaining scheme; the failure of compulsory arbitration in
some contexts; and the fact that the stakes are so high that
arguably they should not be left for resolution by a disinterested
party. The argument that these considerations necessitate different
treatment for interest arbitration under the LMRA is not convinc-
ing. It ignores the possibility that the legislature considered the
relevant policy arguments before it gave federal courts the power
under the LMRA to enforce collective bargaining agreements.
Nevertheless, an evaluation of these arguments will add support to
the contention that the ENA should be enforced.
The possibility of an extreme award is an issue that the
employer and the union must each consider individually before
agreeing to arbitrate their interests. Generally, when an employer
and a union decide that they want to settle their interest disputes
by arbitration, they have expectations that they feel will be better
realized through arbitration than by economic warfare. These expec-
tations are not significantly different from those of the parties who
agree to arbitrate grievance disputes. More importantly, the parties
desire to avoid a work stoppage." When both parties stand to lose
too much through a strike or lockout, they look to viable alter-
natives." Interest arbitration is the most obvious option available.
91. This is what the Union did in the 1977 negotiations. See note 88 supra.
92. See note 133 infra.
93. HANDSAKER, supra note 28, at 69.
94. In the past, the unions and the employers have favored the use of
economic warfare to gain advantages in collective bargaining. When the gains they
stand to win are outweighed by their possible losses in such warfare, they turn to ar-
bitration. Arbitration Agreements, supra note 28, at 112-118.
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I.W. Abel, retired president of the United Steelworkers of America,
has indicated that the desire to avoid a work stoppage was the in-
spiration for the ENA."5 That concept is specifically incorporated in-
to the policy statement of the ENA."
On the surface there is a degree of uncertainty in what the par-
ties hope to gain from the arbitration agreement. The parties seek
completeness in the arbitrator's decision and do not desire further
bargaining to fill it out.' They also hope for a decision that will not
create new inequities. Manifestly, neither party wants to be burden-
ed with an award that would cause it to regret the arbitration
agreement." Fear of the unknown has caused unions and companies
to avoid interest arbitration in the past."
Undoubtedly, it is this same doubt over the outcome that has
caused some courts to avoid enforcing interest arbitration
agreements." There are, however, steps the parties can take to
ameliorate some of the uncertainties that inhere in the arbitration
process. 1°0 In the balance, it is far more important to have consisten-
cy in the application of our federal labor law as applied under the
LMRA °2 than it is to be preoccupied with uncertainties that the par-
ties can avoid through negotiations. Without uniform application of
the law, our federal labor policies will not be completely im-
plemented.
The risk involved in interest arbitration cannot be denied.
However, the extreme award can be overcome by limiting the ar-
bitrator's discretion; the parties can limit the issues that the ar-
bitrator may decide. In the ENA, the parties did this, taking care to
exclude from the arbitrator's jurisdiction certain issues that they
did not want to risk to arbitration. In addition, the parties can
establish a framework within which the arbitrator is to make his
95. ABEL, supra note 4, at 57-62.
96. See note 4 supra.
97. HANDSAKER, supra note 28, at 69.
98. Id.
99. Arbitration Agreements, supra note 28, at 109.
100. See, e.g., Boston Printing Pressmen's Union v. Potter Press, 141 F. Supp.
553, 557 (D. Mass. 1956), where the federal district court wondered "whether such con-
tractual provisions could ordinarily be sufficiently rapidly and fairly interpreted and
applied to serve the cause of industrial peace."
101. See note 5 supra.
102. For a discussion of the need for uniformity in the application of Section
301 of the LMRA, see C. MORRIS The Need for New and Coherent Regulatory
Mechanisms, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: SURVIVAL IN THE '70's? 42, 48-49 (R. Rowan ed.
1972).
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decision. This framework might include appropriate criteria upon
which the arbitrator is to base his determination. 8 The possibility
of an extreme award is also present in grievance arbitration, yet it
did not dissuade the courts from requiring the parties to arbitrate
their grievances. For the same policy reasons this risk should not
stand in the way of an order to arbitrate interest disputes.
Another objection of some courts and commentators to enforcing
interest arbitration agreements is the view that the right to strike
is essential to the collective bargaining process."' It is argued that
judicial intervention would be destructive of this basic right and
would toll the death of collective bargaining. Inherent in this argu-
ment is the notion that the purpose of our federal labor law is sim-
ply to remove impediments to negotations and to "leave the parties
at the door of the bargaining room."1 5
Enforcement of the ENA and other interest arbitration
agreements would not be destructive of the collective bargaining
process. It would be, instead, a guarantee that a bargaining pro-
cedure to which the parties had agreed would be carried out. Thus,
the vitality of collective bargaining would still be maintained. The
notion that the right to strike is essential in labor-management rela-
tions is a concept that belongs to a different period in the history of
collective bargaining.'" At one time, strikes were used to settle day-
to-day grievances under agreements just as they were used to settle
collective bargaining disputes.'O Today, however, federal courts
have taken cognizance of the legislative preferences for peaceful set-
tlement of disputes. Accordingly, they have agreed to enforce
grievance arbitration and no-strike agreements.
103. If the arbitrator is confined to certain issues, and if he must base his deci-
sion only on certain specified criteria, the risks are greatly reduced. See HANDSAKER.
supra note 29.
104. As previously noted, any court refusing to enforce an interest arbitration
agreement would necessarily be relying on the general proscriptions contained in
Norris-La Guardia. See note 61 supra. See also Schulman, Reason, Contract, and Law
in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1024 (1955).
105. Forkosch, Compulsion in Collective Bargaining and Arbitration: A Com-
parison of American and Australian Industrial Law, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 457, 460 (1976).
106. The labor movement is no longer in its infancy. It has emerged as a collec-
tive bargaining equal with employers. Consequently, labor can make collective bargain-
ing gains without the aid of a strike. ABEL, supra note 4. Furthermore, our nation no
longer enjoys the secure place that it once did in the world economic community.
Strikes in major industries carry with them a highly destructive potential. See Flem-
ing, "Interest" Arbitration Revisited, 7 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 1, 3 (1973) (hereinafter cited
as Fleming].
107. Taylor, The Voluntary Arbitration of Labor Disputes, 49 MICH. L. REV.
787, 791 (1951).
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In support of this preference for the peaceful resolution of
disputes, one commentator has noted that "the gravity of a strike in
violation of a no-strike clause cannot be overestimated, since it
deprives the employer of uninterrupted production- the principle
benefit he usually hopes to gain from the collective bargaining
agreement."" 8 The right to strike can no longer be viewed as an
essential right." It is too destructive a force to permit once the par-
ties have agreed not to use it.10
Some countries require unions and companies to arbitrate their
collective bargaining differences."' The failure of such compulsory
arbitration to effectively resolve disputes and to accomplish in-
dustrial peace"' abroad is often cited as a reason not to enforce in-
terest arbitration agreements in the United States."' It has been
hypothesized that government intervention of the type manifested
in compulsory arbitration has a tendency to destroy incentives to
reach agreement in collective bargaining."' The contention is that if
the parties know that they will ultimately have to rely on arbitra-
tion if they fail to reach accord, they will not come to the bargaining
table with a commitment to resolve their differences. 5
A comparison with compulsory arbitration is particularly
unrevealing. The differences between compulsory arbitration of the
108. B. AARON, Arbitration in the Federal Courts: Aftermath of the Trilogy in
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE ARBITRATOR'S ROLE 60, 67 (M. Kahn ed. 1962).
109. "Humanitarians who believe that to strike is a basic human right, used to
further economic justice, have been mislead." W. HUTT. THE THEORY OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 1930-1975 125 (1975). For a list of the destructions that the strike visits on
the economy in general as well as on the individual participants, see id. at 125.
110. See note 121 infra and accompanying text.
111. Australia and Sweden have both used compulsory arbitration of varying
degrees for years. K. LAFFER, Does Compulsory Abrbitration Prevent Strikes? The
Australian Experience, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: SURVIVAL IN THE '70's? 154 (R.
Rowan ed. 1972).
112. The experience in Australia has been that compulsory arbitration did not
eliminate strikes, but may have actually encouraged short term strikes. Id See Sykes,
Labor Regulation by Courts: The Australian Experience, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 462,
485-486 (1957).
113. In Boston Printing Pressmen's Union v. Potter Press, 141 F. Supp. 553 (D.
Mass. 1956), the court observed that an enforcement of an interest arbitration agree-
ment "comes ... perilously close" to an attempt at complusory arbitration. Id at 557.
See also Enforceability of Interest Arbitration, supra note 52, at 1006.
114. LIVERNASH. supra note 38, at 208.
115. Id See also HANDSAKER. supra note 29, at 38-39. This fear proved war-
rantless in the 1974 collective bargaining in the steel industry when the ENA was first
applied. The parties apparently bargained with the same intensity to avoid arbitration
as they had in previous years to avoid a strike or lock out. See ABEL, supra note 4.
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type found in foreign countries and interest arbitration of the type
comprehended by the ENA are too extensive to explore at length
here."' It should suffice to say that the latter requires a joint agree-
ment between the employer and the union to permit a third party to
resolve specific collective bargaining issues. Compulsory arbitration
requires no such agreement. It is forced upon the parties by the law
of the land and leaves nothing to the discretion of the individuals in-
volved. Judicial enforcement in either event will visit arbitration on
an unwilling party."7 The courts, nevertheless, have been willing to
do that in grievance arbitration cases.
It is unlikely that enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate in-
terests will be a deterrent to effective collective bargaining. The
risk of an extreme award has already been discussed, and it is
precisely the element of risk that makes arbitration such an effec-
tive substitute for the strike. Only when the parties have something
to lose in arbitration are they likely to try to avoid it. The efforts
that the parties will expend to accomplish that avoidance should
guarantee good faith bargaining.
In addition to the possibility of an extreme or unduly burden-
some award resulting from an arbitrator's resolution of a collective
bargaining agreement, there is some concern that the stakes are so
high that they should not be forced on an unwilling party. The
answer to this is that in resolving grievances, arbitrators are often
charged wih deciding matters that involve stakes equally as high as
those involved in interest arbitration."" Furthermore, the parties
often leave matters relatively unsettled in their collective bargain-
116. In light of the different economic and political structures involved, a com-
parison of our industrial relations experiences with those of foreign countries is "of
limited utility in developing and improving our own collective bargaining systems." B.
AARON, Collective Bargaining Where Strikes Are Not Tolerated, in COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING: SURVIVAL IN THE '70's? 129, 146 (R. Rowan ed. 1972).
117. It has been said that if one of the parties is not willing to have a dispute
arbitrated, there is no difference between enforcement of an interest arbitration agree-
ment and legislatively compelled arbitration. Enforceability Of Interest Arbitration,
supra note 53, at 1006.
118. In Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974), the
Union struck and demanded the discharge of several foremen before they would return
to work. The foremen involved had falsified air flow records, thus risking the lives of
all the men who worked in the mine. There was a no-strike clause and an arbitration
clasue in the collective bargaining agreement. However, the dispute was at least
arguably not within the arbitrator's jurisdiction. Furthermore, the strike was arguably
not prohibited by the no-strike agreement. Despite the fact that employees' lives were
at stake, the Court held that the Union must discontinue the strike and arbitrate the
dispute.
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ing agreements. When a dispute arises the arbitrator is left to
develop a resolution for prospective application.9 The courts have
recognized that this type of issue is properly within the arbitrator's
jurisdiction and have ordered arbitration of such issues." It is dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to perceive a difference between this type of
arbitration and interest arbitration.
Perhaps if the consequences of a strike and refusal to arbitrate
in violation of ENA were confined to the parties to the agreement,
there would be a stronger argument in favor of the courts' refusal
to enforce the agreement. However, that will not be the case. The
consequences of such violations will have far reaching effects on the
entire public.'21 Consumers will be relying on continued steel produc-
tion. These consumers will lose production if their reliance is
frustrated. Jobs will be lost, and those outside the steel industry
will suffer reduced income and buying power.
The benefits of waiting for a specific political resolution of the
matter are overcome by the economic havoc such a strike might
visit on the national economy as well as on the individual par-
ticipants. There appears to be no reason to wait for a political
resolution when one considers that the legislature has already
declared that collective bargaining agreements should be enforced. 12 2
Problems presented by an interest arbitration agreement, such
as the fears of an unduly burdensome arbitration award and the
general fear that the parties may not genuinely bargain when they
know they must rely on the arbitrator to resolve their differences,
are not insurmountable. When the parties are sufficiently mature to
119. It should be noted that in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Naviga-
tion Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), the Union tried for nineteen years to get a limitation in
the collective bargaining agreement on the Company's right to contract out certain
work. Despite the fact that the Union failed to get such a limitation in the agreement,
the Court ordered the parties to arbitrate a dispute over work that the Company con-
tracted out. See Stewart, No-Strike Clauses in the Federal Courts, 59 MICH. L. REV.
673, 693-694 (1961). See also Fleming, supra note 106, at 2-3.
120. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960).
121. Id See also J. Hodgson, The Survival of Collective Bargaining, in COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING: SURVIVAL IN THE '70's? 3, 7 (R. Rowan ed. 1972).
122. The policy of section 301 of the LMRA is to make contracts between labor
and management enforceable. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957). Section 301 does not confine itself to grievance disputes under collective
bargaining agreements. Rather, the term contract as used in section 301 should be
given a construction that comprehends interest arbitration agreements. A. Seltzer &
Co. v. Livingston, 253 F. Supp. 509, 513 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'i, 361 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1966).
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develop so sophisticated an agreement as the ENA, they are entire-
ly capable of curing any of these problems when they bargain for
the agreement. Certainly, if arbitration is regarded by the parties as
something they seek to avoid, it can serve as effectively as the
strike to spur the parties to bargain collectively. The fears express-
ed by some courts and commentators are not sufficient reason to ig-
nore the legislative and judicial mandates that should control such a
case.
In addition to these general policy considerations, the federal
labor law favors the enforceability of the ENA. The ENA is no less
a collective bargaining agreement than the Basic Labor
Agreements'" that govern the relationship between the union and
the companies for a period of years.1 2 ' Therefore, the no-strike and
arbitration clauses of the ENA should be specifically enforced in
federal courts under the authority of section 301 of the LMRA as in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court.
APPLICATION OF FEDERAL LABOR LAW TO VIOLATIONS OF THE ENA
Violations of the ENA are contractual and thus within the
jurisdiction of federal courts under the LMRA. However, such viola-
tions all relate to an interest arbitration provision. Until now, only
strikes over grievances that are subject to an agreement's arbitra-
tion clause have been enjoined under the authority of Supreme
Court decisions. Furthermore, under the authority of past decisions
the strike may only be enjoined if it is also in violation of a no-strike
clause.
There does not appear to be any compelling reason to limit
these Supreme Court decisions to grievance arbitration disputes.
Grievance and interest arbitration are used in different contexts and
at different stages in the genesis and life of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. However, the same federal policy considerations that
are served by enforcing grievance arbitration clauses would be
undermined if they were denied effect to enforce interest arbitra-
tion provisions. Thus, violations of the ENA at either the industry-
wide or the local level should be enjoined.
Federal labor policy as reflected by the Supreme Court deci-
sions in Lincoln Mills, The Steelworkers Trilogy, Boys Markets, and
123. See note 23 supra.
124. The word contract in section 301(a) of the LMRA is given a broad con-
struction. It is not limited to collective bargaining agreements. A. Seltzer & Co. v. Liv-
ingston, 253 F. Supp. 509, 513 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 361 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1966). See also
Retail Clerks Inter. Ass'n. v. Lion Dry Good, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 25-28 (1962).
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Gateway Coal supports enforcement of the ENA. Indeed, a refusal
to enforce such an agreement would necessarily rely on the Nor-
ris-La Guardia Act.1  The Supreme Court, however, has clearly
said that Norris-La Guardia is to be strictly applied only in narrow
contexts. ' " It is to be applied in conformity with its purpose and in
compatability with section 301 of the LMRA. It would, therefore, be
error to apply Norris-La Guardia so as to undermine other federal
labor policies.
The enforcement of the interest arbitration and no-strike
clauses of the ENA would, in fact, be in furtherance of the
legislative purpose behind Norris-La Guardia." Enforcing an obliga-
tion that the union freely undertook for its own benefit128 would be
more supportive than destructive of the labor movement. If neither
the union nor the company can be forced to perform as promised,
the union has lost a significant battle in its struggle to emerge as a
collective bargaining equal.
Furthermore, in Lincoln Mills, the Court declared that the
federal labor law to be applied under the LMRA was not limited by
the express words of the statute.'" It was to be whatever the courts
deemed necessary to further the underlying principles supporting
our federal labor law. Clearly, the underlying principles expressed
by the Court in recent cases" favor the enforcement of interest ar-
125. The Norris-La Guardia Act generally prohibits federal courts from issuing
injunctions in labor disputes. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). See note 56 supra.
126. Since Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), with the
exception of Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976), and Sinclair
Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), the Court has applied Norris-La Guardia
only to those concerns at which the Act was directed. For a description of the labor
management relationship that precipitated the Norris-La Guardia Act see Note, Strik-
ing A Balance Between the Norris-La Guardia Act and the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act: Is It Still Feasible After Buffalo Forge?, 29 U. OF FLA. L. REV. 525, 526-527
(1977).
127. The following observations by the Court in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 252-253 (1970), are equally applicable to interest arbitra-
tion agreements: "[Tihe central purpose of the Norris-La Guardia Act to foster the
growth and vitality of labor organizations is hardly retarded-if anything, this goal is
advanced-by a remedial device that merely enforces the obligation that the union
freely undertook under a specifically enforceable agreement to submit disputes to ar-
bitration."
128. See the preamble to the ENA note 4 supra.
129. See note 64 supra.
130. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974) (When
the parties argue that the dispute is not arbitrable, a presumption of arbitrability will
apply, and the court may enjoin a strike pending the outcome of an arbitration award.);
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (The purpose of ar-
bitration procedures is to avoid strikes while settling industrial disputes. Therefore,
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bitration to which the parties have agreed.18 If a single concept is
the controlling force behind the emerging federal labor law, it would
have to be the desire to resolve industrial disputes in a peaceful
manner and in a manner to which the parties have agreed. Section
201(b) of the LMRA lends support to this concept in declaring that
the policy of the United States favors "the settlement of issues ...
by such methods as may be provided for in any applicable agree-
ment for the settlement of disputes." '
Although the Supreme Court has not yet determined whether
interest arbitration agreements and accompanying no-strike
agreements are subject to the same law as are grievance arbitration
agreement, several lower federal courts have been faced with that
issue. Their decisions have not been harmonious."= Some have felt
courts may enjoin strikes and order arbitration of underlying grievances.);
Steelworkers Trilogy, 363 U.S. 564, 574, 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (presumption of ar-
bitrability-the parties have a duty to arbitrate which the courts will enforce); Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (Section 301(a) of the LMRA is a
source of substantive law that includes a mandate to federal courts to encourage
peaceful settlements of industrial disputes). But see Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976) (An injunction may not issue against a sympathy
strike because there is no underlying grievance.).
131. Once the parties have agreed to a peaceful method for resolving their dif-
ferences, the reasons for denying injunctive relief disappear. In the cases cited in note
130 supra, the Court was admittedly dealing with grievance disputes. That fact,
however, should not be regarded as significant. One court faced with a request for an
order to enforce an interest arbitration agreement could find "no basis for a distinc-
tion" between interest and grievance arbitration provisions in a collective bargaining
agreement. Pressmen's Local 50 v. Newspaper Printing Corp., 399 F. Supp. 593, 599
(M.D. Tenn. 1974), affl'd, 518 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1975).
132. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 201(b), 29 U.S.C. § 171 (b)
(1970) (emphasis added).
133. Courts that have ordered arbitration of interests are: Pressmen's Local 50
v. Newspaper Printing Corp., 518 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1975), affg, 399 F. Supp. 593 (M.D.
Tenn. 1974); Pressman Local 318 v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 393 F.2d 221 (4th Cir.
1968), affg, 263 F. Supp. 952 (M.D.N.C. 1967); A. Seltzer & Co. v. Livingston, 361 F.2d
218 (2d Cir.), aff'g, 253 F. Supp. 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Greater Kansas City Dist. Council
v. Builders Ass'n, 326 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1964), affg, 213 F. Supp. 429 (W.D. Mo. 1963),
cerL denied, 377 U.S. 917 (1964); Division 892 St. Elec. Ry. Employees v. M.K. & 0.
Transit Lines, Inc., 319 F.2d 488 (10th Cir. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 210 F. Supp.
351 (N.D. Okla. 1962), cert denied 375 U.S. 944 (1963).
Courts that have refused to order arbitration of interests are: Mailers Local 136
v. Newspapers, Inc., 329 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1964), affg, 226 F. Supp. 600 (W.D. Tex.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); Pressmen's Local 67 v. Potter Press, 241 F.2d
787 (st Cir. 1957), aff'g, 141 F. Supp. 553 (D. Mass. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 817
(1957); Typographical Local 21 v. San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., 247 F. Supp.
963 (N.D. Cal. 1965); Couch v. Prescolite Mfg. Corp.. 191 F. Supp. 737 (W.D. Ark. 1961);
Valencia Baxt Express, Inc. v. Seafarers Int'l Union, 199 F. Supp 103 (D.P.R. 1961).
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that interest arbitration is sui generis.' " Those courts have felt that
too much is at stake since the parties may have agreed to the in-
terest arbitration provision without intending it to be judicially en-
forced."'5 Moreover, it was argued that the courts are not equipped
to decide such an important issue. Various courts and commentators
have agreed that the matter is of such overwhelming significance
that if interest arbitration agreements are to be specifically enforc-
ed, the legislature should make that determination.'" Other courts
have found no good reason to distinguish interest arbitration from
grievance arbitration. 7 Relying on the doctrine of the Steelworkers
Trilogy,"' one such court noted that as long as the court is satisfied
that the agreement comprehends arbitration of the dispute, it
should order specific performance. 8'
The courts which fail to perceive a difference between interest
arbitration and grievance arbitration that would compel a separate
treatment under the federal labor law have properly followed the
mandate given them in the Lincoln Mills decision. These courts
recognize that there are differences between the two procedures,"'
but conclude that the differences are not of sufficient magnitude to
warrant different treatment."'
Most federal courts would concur that they have been issued a
mandate to require the parties to arbitrate grievance disputes when
they have promised to do so in a collective bargaining agreement.
They are not, however, unanimous in their perception of that man-
date as extending to agreements to arbitrate interests. Never-
theless, the LMRA does not distinguish between grievance and in-
terest disputes. Section 201 of that Act expressly records the
federal labor policy as favoring the peaceful resolution of interest
disputes in a manner to which the parties have agreed. That policy
134. See, e.g., Boston Printing Pressmen's Union v. Potter Press, 141 F. Supp.
553 (D. Mass. 1956).
135. In Boston Printing Pressmen's Union v. Potter Press, 141 F. Supp. 553 (D.
Mass. 1956), Judge Wyzanski observed that the parties agreed to the interest arbitra-
tion voluntarily, but he feared that they may have done so "without envisaging a possi-
ble judicial enforcement." Id. at 557.
136. Id. See also Enforceability of Interest Arbitration, supra note 53, at
1009-1010.
137. See note 130 supra.
138. See notes 68-72 supra and accompanying text.
139. Pressmen's Local 50 v. Newspaper Printing Corp., 399 F. Supp. 593 (M.D.
Tenn. 1974), aff'd, 518 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1975).
140. For a discussion of the differences between grievances and interest ar-
bitration, see notes 19-30 supra and accompanying text.
141. Courts that have ordered arbitration of interests despite these differences
are listed in note 133 supra.
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cannot be realized unless federal courts are willing to enforce in-
terest arbitration agreements.
Under the ENA, a refusal to arbitrate interests and a strike in
support of industry-wide issues clearly would be in violation of the
agreement. Such activity would present a situation that would be
comparable to violations of coterminous no-strike and grievance ar-
bitration provisions in a collective bargaining agreement and should,
therefore, be enjoined. Violations of the ENA at the local level re-
quire closer scrutiny to determine whether or not they should also
be enjoined.
Violations Of ENA At The Local Level
Having determined that the arbitration and no-strike provi-
sions of the ENA should be specifically enforced by federal courts, a
more difficult question remains. That question is whether a violation
of the ENA of the type where the parties reach agreement on all
industry-wide issues and subsequently attempt to bargain at the
local plants over non-local issues should be enjoined.""2 The problem
arises in this type of case when the local union strikes in support of
the non-local demands. Normally the union has the right to strike at
the local level" 8 and to enjoin such activity would usually be a
misapplication of the law."' However, when the union strikes over
non-local issues in violation of the ENA, the courts should enjoin the
activity under the authority of section 301 of the LMRA because the
parties have agreed to arbitrate these non-local issues.
In the one decision by a federal court concerning this issue,"5
the court denied injunctive relief to the companies when local unions
threatened to strike over non-local issues. However, in that case, the
companies failed to allege violations of the ENA. They argued in-
stead that the local strikes would be in violation of the existing
Basic Labor Agreements. Since the union was seeking to gain provi-
sions that were admittedly not already a part of the existing
agreements, the court felt compelled by Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers of America,' to deny injunctive relief."7 It is not clear
142. See notes 35 and 88 supra and accompanying text.
143. See note 56 supra.
144. Absent a binding agreement, section 301 of the LMRA is ineffective to
give federal courts jurisdiction over a labor dispute. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
145. Coordinating Committee Steel Companies v. United Steelworkers, No.
77-861 (W.D. Pa. July 29, 1977).
146. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
147. See note 84 supra.
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what the court's decision would have been had the companies alleg-
ed a violation of the ENA. However, the court should have granted
the relief sought if this argument had been made.
The ENA clearly prohibits strikes at local plants over non-local
issues." 8 It does not, however, specifically comprehend arbitration of
disputes concerned with whether an issue is of the type over which
the ENA precludes local bargaining. Nor does the ENA specifically
provide a procedure for the settlement of such disagreements."
Nevertheless, the failure of the ENA to provide such arbitration
procedures should not be construed by the federal courts as a bar to
their authority under the LMRA to enjoin ENA strikes and to order
arbitration.
There is no disagreement that strikes over non-local issues are
violative of the ENA. In addition, if such a strike occurs, the com-
panies can meet the equitable requirements for an injunction."0
Therefore, if it is accepted that interest arbitration clauses should
be treated the same as grievance arbitration clauses in collective
bargaining agreements, the only obstacle to issuing an injunction is
a finding that a srike is over an arbitrable dispute."'
Federal labor policy supports the view that if either party
claims that the dispute is arbitrable, a court should order arbitra-
tion. If a strike has occurred, the court should also enjoin the strike
pending the arbitration award. In the Steelworkers Trilogy,"2 the
148. The ENA authorizes strikes at local plants only over local issues. See note
35 supr. See also Coordinating Committee Steel Companies v. United Steelworkers,
No. 77-861, at 11 (W.D. Pa. July 29, 1977) (finding that the "imminent strikes will
violate the no-strike provision of the ENA-77").
149. This has been declared to be a critical defect in the ENA. Coordinating
Committee Steel Companies v. United Steelworkers, No. 77-861, at 13 (W.D. Pa. July
29, 1977).
150.
The breach of the no-strike clause has caused and will cause irreperable
harm to the Companies and the employer would suffer more from the
denial of an injunction than the Union would suffer from its issuance;
tremendous damage will be incurred by the Plaintiffs if an injunction is
not issued, while the harm resulting to the Steelworkers would be only
that which they bargained for.
Id at 14. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 254 (1970),
for the circumstances under which it is appropriate to issue an injunction.
151. In Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976), the ques-
tion thought by the Court to be critical was whether the strike was over an arbitrable
grievance. Therefore in the case of the ENA, the question must be whether the strike
is over an arbitrable interest. See note 84 supra.
152. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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Supreme Court found that the draftsmen of a collective bargaining
agreement could not have possibly foreseen all possible areas of
disagreement.' This is the reason for the incorporation of arbitra-
tion procedures into labor-management contracts. Accordingly, the
Court found that the arbitration provisions of the agreement should
be construed as comprehending all matters of disagreement except
those which the parties have specifically excluded.1'
The Trilogy doctrine has not been abandoned; if anything it has
been expanded. In Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mineworkers, 15 the
Court reiterated the concept. It held that the agreement to arbitrate
and the duty not to strike have coterminous application-the all in-
clusiveness of one applying equally to the other. This concept
strengthens the argument that a local strike over non-local issues
should be enjoined pending arbitration of the underlying interest
dispute.
Clearly, the union agreed not to strike over non-local issues
once they accepted the ENA. They have also agreed to arbitrate
any dispute over these issues at the industry-wide level. A strike at
the local level found to be in violation of the ENA is, therefore, no
less a violation of the arbitration provisions of that agreement just
because it is executed at the local level. It is, instead, an attempt to
avoid arbitration that should not be sanctioned by the courts. In
keeping with the Trilogy doctrine, the arbitration panel should be
permitted to determine whether the dispute is susceptible to ar-
bitration. Perhaps the panel would determine that the dispute was
beyond their jurisdiction. Nevertheless, as long as the dispute is
arguably within the jurisdiction of the arbitration panel, the court
should refrain from preliminarily deciding that the issue is not ar-
bitrable.57
Finally, the arbitration and no-strike provisions of the ENA are
broad enough to comprehend arbitration of these local disputes. The
ENA does not specifically provide a procedure for settling this kind
of problem, but arbitration clauses seldom detail every possible
153. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581
(1960).
154. Id
155. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
156. Id at 382.
157. This is a view that corresponds with our federal labor policy as declared
by the Trilogy Court, e.g., United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,
568-569 (1960). The underlying purpose of that policy is to let the parties settle their
disputes as they agreed. See Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 MICH.
L. REV. 635, 649-651 (1968-69).
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dispute that may be decided under them. Thus, even when a strike
occurs or an attempt is made to bargain over non-local issues at the
local level, the court should enjoin strikes and order arbitration so
that collective bargaining disputes between the parties will be
resolved as they intended.'58
CONCLUSION
The legislature has recognized the desirability of the peaceful
resolution of industrial disputes.'59 Accordingly, the courts have
been granted jurisdiction over suits for violation of contracts be-
tween employers and labor unions in industries affecting commerce.'"
In the interest of enforcing the legislative intent, the Supreme
Court has interpreted this grant of jurisdiction as more than a
license to award damages, but has found it also to be an authoriza-
tion to grant equitable remedies to parties who have been or will be
seriously injured by a violation of a collective bargaining agreement
and who have no adequate remedy available at law.'' Thus, the
158. The union and the steel companies have agreed to use the ENA again in
1980 when they bargain for their next collective bargaining agreement. Since this note
was written, there has been a change in the ENA implementation procedures. A letter
dated November 4, 1977 from J. Bruce Johnston for the Coordinating Committee Steel
Companies to Lloyd McBride, President of the United Steelworkers of America con-
firmed the parties' agreement to arbitrate any dispute "concerning whether or not a
matter in bargaining meets the ENA-80 requirements of a 'local collective bargaining
issue."'
In the future, therefore, when a local union strikes or attempts to bargain over a
matter which the company contends to be a non-local issue, a federal court will not be
faced with the problem of having to determine whether or not the subject is ar-
bitrable. Furthermore, if the union strikes instead of arbitrating such a dispute, a
court should enjoin the strike and order arbitration without regard to the interest-
grievance distinction. Under this new agreement, the only thing to be determined in
arbitration is whether or not an issue is a valid matter for collective bargaining at the
local level. The arbitration process will not resolve any interests and the dispute,
therefore, should be viewed by the courts as if it were a grievance dispute.
159. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d)
(1970). See note 72 supra. Furthermore 29 U.S.C. § 171(b) (1970) declares the policy of
the United States to be:
The settlement of issues between employers and employees through col-
lective bargaining may be advanced by making available full and adequate
governmental facilities for ... voluntary arbitration to aid and encourage
employers and the representatives of their employees to reach and main-
tain agreements . .. and to make all reasonable efforts to settle their dif-
ferences by mutual agreement reached through conferences and collective
bargaining or by such methods as may be provided for in any applicable
agreement for the settlement of disputes.
160. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
161. E.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
See notes 81-87 supra and accompanying text.
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Court deemed it proper to order the parties in a collective bargain-
ing agreement to arbitrate disputes that are found to be within the
purview of an arbitration clause in the agreement."'2 More recently,
the Court has deemed it proper to enjoin strikes when they occur
because of an arbitrable grievance and when the collective bargain-
ing agreement includes both no-strike and arbitration clauses. " In
such a case, at the same time the strike is enjoined the Court must
also order the parties to arbitrate the underlying grievance.'
There is some disagreement about whether the equitable
remedies generally available to parties under a collective bargaining
agreement should extend to a no-strike provision coupled with a pro-
mise to arbitrate interests."5 Under the Experimental Negotiating
Agreement (ENA), the United Steelworkers of America and ten ma-
jor steel producers agreed to avoid strikes by resolving their in-
terest disputes through arbitration. Because the parties to ENA
may renege on their agreement and refuse to arbitrate or else at-
tempt to bargain at the local level over non-local issues, it is
necessary to consider whether the no-strike and arbitration clauses
of the ENA are enforceable in equity.
There are no compelling reasons to treat the interest arbitra-
tion and no-strike provisions of the ENA differently than the no-
strike and grievance arbitration provisions under a collective
bargaining agreement. It has been argued that the stakes are too
high in interest arbitration, and, therefore, courts should not require
the parties to carry through with their agreement. However, the
stakes can be equally high in grievance arbitration.'"
It has also been argued that the courts should wait for the
legislature to make its intent clear with regard to the enforceability
of interest arbitration agreements. 67 This agrument ignores the
possibility that the legislature has already sufficiently clarified its
intent.'" The purpose behind the ENA and other interest arbitration
162. See notes 62-72 supra and accompanying text.
163. E.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
164. Id. at 254.
165. Compare Boston Printing Pressmen's Union v. Potter Press, 141 F. Supp.
553 (D. Mass. 1956), with Pressmen's Local 50 v. Newspaper Printing Corp., 399 F.
Supp. 593 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), affd, 518 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1975). See also Enforceability
of Interest Arbitration, supra note 53. Gregory, supra note 80.
166. See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
167. Judge Wyzanski said this in Boston Printing Pressmen's Union v. Potter
Press, 141 F. Supp. 553, 557 (D. Mass. 1956).
168. One observor has noted that "[Tihe Court treats Section 301 virtually as a
delegation by Congress to the federal courts of its legislative power to develop a
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 [1977], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol12/iss1/3
1977] EXPERIMENTAL NEGOTIATING A GREEMENT 89
agreements is identical to the purpose behind grievance arbitration
provisions in collective bargaining agreements. The parties hope to
settle their industrial disputes without a strike.169 Absent an
available means for enforcing the agreement, the parties will be left
without a cogent reason for entering into the agreement in the first
place. Thus, in the interest of uniform application of federal labor
law under section 301 of the LMRA, federal courts should enforce
the ENA and other interest arbitration agreements.
Finally, when determining whether to order arbitration and en-
join a strike in violation of the ENA, a court should not deviate
from established principles that have already been applied to
grievance arbitration clauses. If a strike occurs in violation of the
ENA, as long as the court can find irreparable injury to the com-
panies and inadequate remedies available at law,17 ° the court should
enjoin the strike and order arbitration. Just as with grievance ar-
bitration, the courts should resolve doubts in favor of arbitration.
Only when it is clear that the parties have excluded the particular
dispute from the procedure 7' should the court refuse to order ar-
bitration.
The courts should not lose sight of the fact that the duty to ar-
bitrate and the proscription against strikes are coterminous. Unless
it can be said with assurance that a strike is not over an arbitrable
interest,' the underlying reason for the strike should be presumed
to be arbitrable. In the case of strikes at local plants over non-local
issues in violation of ENA, the non-local issues are at least arguably
subject to the ENA arbitration clause. Therefore, when faced with
such a violation of the ENA, federal courts should enjoin the strike
and order the parties to arbitrate their dispute.
detailed body of law governing collective agreements made in commerce." Gregory,
supra note 80, at 640. If this is true, there is no reason to wait for further congres-
sional action.
169. As long as the parties have agreed to resolve their collective bargaining
disputes in arbitration, "[Nlothing would be more out of step with our national labor
policies than for courts to refuse to enforce such an agreement." Winston-Salem Prin-
ting Pressmen and Assistant's Union v. Peidmont Publishing Company, 393 F.2d 221,
227 (4th Cir. 1968).
170. See notes 81-87 supra and accompanying text.
171. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mineworkers, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974). See
also Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1517 (1959).
172. Cf. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976) (sym-
pathy strike-no underlying grievances precipitated the strike).
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